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ABSTRACT 
As China emerges as a major world power, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has 
adjusted its ideology to maintain national spirit and power.  Elements of this adjustment 
can be seen in changes within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).  As the PLA 
aggressively pursues a revolution in military affairs with Chinese characteristics, some 
have asserted the PLA’s modernization and professionalization reform involves reviving 
values and ideals associated with Confucianism and China’s traditional past.  This thesis 
will reveal that the PLA has not revived values and ideals associated with Confucianism 
in its drive to modernize.  Instead, the PLA is incorporating values and ideals similar to 
other modernizing militaries that have some similarities to ancient Chinese ideals but are 
comparatively different.  The values and ideals the PLA has incorporated provide a 
foundation for all service members and clarify allegiances, define acceptable ethical 
behavior, elucidate competing ideological thoughts, establish a benchmark for military 
members’ actions with each other and with society, and facilitate loyalty to the CCP. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
 As China emerges as a major world power, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
has adjusted its ideology to maintain national spirit and maintain power.  In October 2006 
at the China’s Sixth Plenum of the 16th Central Committee, the Party endorsed the 
concept of a “harmonious society” in China, which would require the push for a 
“harmonious socialist culture” built upon a “socialist core values system.”1   
 Elements of this adjustment may be seen in changes within the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA).  The 2004 PRC White Paper on national defense included a 
chapter called “Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,” which 
without specifying what these “Chinese characteristics” are described how the PLA is 
modernizing with regard to structure, training, logistical reform and political work.2  In 
2008, Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, extended the 
concept of “socialist core values” directly into the PLA under the concept of “the core 
values of military personnel.”   
 The inculcation of new values and ideals in the PLA raises basic questions.  What 
are the values and ideals that the PLA is inculcating in its soldiers to support military 
modernization?  Are they comparable to values and ideals used in other contemporary 
militaries, either in the West or the Third World?  Do they reflect a significant departure 
from the Soviet-era values and ideals that shaped the PLA in the period before the current 
military modernization effort began in 1985?  To what extent do they draw on elements 
of martial values of China’s traditional past?  Specifically, is the CCP reviving values and 
ideals associated with Confucianism, as some have asserted, in its drive to modernize 
China’s military?  
                                                 
1 James C. Mulvenon, “Hu Jintao and the ‘Core Values of Military Personnel,’” China Leadership 
Monitor, no. 28 (Spring 2009): 1. 
2 Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 13. 
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B. IMPORTANCE 
A thorough assessment of the nature and source of the values and ideals the CCP 
is injecting into the PLA modernization process may reveal valuable insights into the 
strategic culture of China’s contemporary military. In recent years, there has been 
extensive but unresolved debate as to whether there is a distinctly Chinese way of war.  
Some have argued that Beijing’s approach to the use of force, its views on strategy, its 
preferences regarding what kind of military it requires, and the kind of soldiers it should 
train reflect characteristically “Chinese” cultural preferences and choices.  Others argue 
that China’s strategic culture is not intrinsically different from other modern militaries, 
and that insofar as the PLA is modern, it increasingly reflects a strategic culture like other 
modern militaries.  A careful examination of the “core values” of the PLA may shed 
useful insight into the strategic culture debate, and so, contribute to evaluation of the 
PLA’s evolving capabilities as a fighting force. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
 My hypothesis is that the ideals the PLA is using to modernize the military have 
some similarities to ancient Chinese ideals but overall are comparatively different.  
Moreover, I argue that the values and ideals the PLA uses to modernize are more 
comparable to other modernizing militaries.  In order to assess the degree to which the 
contemporary effort to inculcate new values and ideals in the PLA draws on military 
ideals imported from China’s traditional past, the thesis first focuses on the precise 
definitions of the values and ideals the PLA is adopting.  It then compares them to those 
used in traditional China.  Comparing traditional values with those of today present 
difficulties.   
 In the sixth century BCE, before the first Chinese empire, Confucius strove to live 
a moral life in chaotic and disorderly time.  Confucius had a lasting impact on subsequent 
periods of Chinese history as a broad tradition of ethical and socio-political commentary.  
Over time, Confucianism and its emphasis on learning and virtue became a part of 
Chinese governance, survived the rise and fall of dynasties, and are still very much alive 
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today.3  Yet, one problem with comparing past values to ones of today is that over time 
the values change and may be altered according to the circumstances and goals of those 
interpreting them.  Ideals can change according to culture, and culture changes over time.  
If a set of values is adopted as an official philosophy, problems may arise with relating it 
to new realities.4  The meaning and content of an ideal today does not necessarily 
accurately relate the original interpretation and meaning of the same ideal in the past.  For 
the purpose of this research, I define the parameters of traditional Chinese ideals and 
values to those of the works and interpretations from the times of Confucius and his early 
followers.  The words “value” and “ideal” are often incorrectly used synonymously 
because of their frequent use.  A value is defined as “something (as a principle or quality) 
intrinsically valuable or desirable.”5  Values are subject to interpretation according to 
culture, and one’s experience over time.  An ideal is “an ultimate object or aim of 
endeavor” pointing to a “standard of perfection, beauty, and excellence.”6  Ideals can be 
goals one aims to achieve.  In context with each other, often one establishes and lives by 
values to come closer to achieving an ideal.  In Chinese, “value” (价值 jià zhí) and 
“ideal” (理想 lǐ xiǎng) have different meanings but are also sometimes mistakenly used 
interchangeably.  This research, value and ideal are not meant to be used interchangeably 
but sometimes are in translations or incorrect use by an author. 
 Furthermore, research on the PLA must contend with the problem of finding 
reliable and accurate information.  Apart from work on the PLA by foreign researchers, 
useful information may be gleaned from documents produced by the PLA itself—mainly 
from the PLA daily newspaper Liberation Army Daily.  However, the validity of such 
data must be scrutinized carefully, as it is subject to censorship before it is published.  
                                                 
3 Rhoads Murphey, East Asia: A New History, 4th ed, (New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007), 64. 
4 Arthur Wright, Confucianism and Chinese Civilization (New York: Atheneum, 1964), 4. 
5 Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/value/ (accessed April 5, 2010). 
6 Ibid. 
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The conjecture that the CCP is using elements of the same ideologies and 
philosophies used thousands of years ago is ironic because in China’s more recent 
political history there was a push by political elite to break China with the past. 
D.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Several works present conclusions regarding the relevance of Chinese traditional 
values and the program to modernize the military. 
1. PLA Modernization and Revolution in Military Affairs      
 Dennis Blasko points out that the PLA, in endorsing the concept of promoting 
“military transformation with Chinese Characteristics,” is a “logical continuation of the 
PLA’s multifaceted military modernization program that has been underway for 25 
years.”7  The concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) when applied to 
China, stated Blasko, is the “method by which China will build its new military force.”8  
The Chinese characteristics or “Chinese-style military change” is the blending of old (the 
principles of “people’s war”) with the new focus on principles to fight and win a “local 
war under informationalized conditions.”9   
 Part of that relationship of old and new, according to Blasko, is the role of man in 
war.  Citing Jiang Zamin’s 1990 quote: “Though we’re unable to develop all high-
technology weapons and equipment within a short period of time, we must train qualified 
personnel first, for we would rather let our qualified personnel wait for equipment than 
the other way around” (emphasis added).10  Blasko points out that a fundamental 
principle of PLA modernization is that China intends to increase its mechanization and 
information technology application in the warfare, as well as be able to utilize the 
technology at all levels on the battlefield.  “Even as large quantities of new equipment 
                                                 
7 Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 13. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Wang Congiao, “Jiang Zemin’s Book on Technology, Army Building Viewed,” Yangcheng 
Wanbao (internet Version-WWW) in Chinese, February 13, 2001,  
https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display
/CPP20010221000077?searchKey=341377&rpp=10&index=9/ (accessed February 24, 2010). 
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enter the force, constant emphasis remains on traditional PLA operational methods 
incorporating speed, mobility, stealth, deception, and use of stratagem to confuse or 
mislead the enemy.  These methods depend more on Chinese ingenuity than expensive 
technology….”11 12   
 China concedes that it does not yet have the hardware or expertise to match other 
global powers’ military force projection capabilities.  However, a whole chapter on the 
“Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics” in the 2004 White Paper on 
National Defense highlights the PLA’s focus on individual training in tandem with other 
military modernization goals.  The 2006 and 2008 White Papers also describe training 
personnel as a central focus for a more modern and professional military.  
2.  Ideological Change  
 James Mulvenon states there has been and continues to be a fundamental 
ideological change in the PLA, as seen with changes in the military education system and 
increased functional specialization among ranks.  One way the PLA has modernized is 
that it has drastically changed its military educational system.13  The curriculum for 
military education has become “increasingly professional in orientation” and “the PLA’s 
higher rates of education are enhancing the professional expertise of the officer corps.”14  
Not only has military training been upgraded, but since the early 1990s there has also 
been a change in ideological focus.15  Former military education involved intense 
political indoctrination.  Today, education is presented to military members with a 
division between military and politics.16  Specifically, emphasis has been changed from 
                                                 
11 Blasko’s use of the word “traditional” in this context refers to China’s military focus to fight wars 
close to Chinese borders.   
12 Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 12. 
13 Information was part of a RAND study for the Office of Secretary of Defense in which Mulvenon 
was tasked to analyze key factors influencing China’s emergent national security strategies, policies, and 
military capabilities. 
14 James Mulvenon, Professionalization of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps: Trends and Implications 
(Washington D.C.: Rand, 1997), 22. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 23. 
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the Chinese military carrying out the tasks of a revolution-type military under Mao to a 
military “assigned to deal with high-tech warfare.”17 
 Functional specialization, training, the role of university education and other 
formal education influences in the PLA professionalization process has also changed.  
The rank-and-file soldier carrying the “little red book” has changed to one who is more 
specialized which, according to Mulvenon, not only strongly suggests a change in ideals 
but also that “the PLA as a military organization is abandoning generalism and cross-
fertilization in favor of functional specialization, as dictated by the demands of modern 
technological warfare.”18  
 Mulvenon’s book is insightful in that it shows the PLA is incorporating a new 
ideology of education to combat ever changing threats.  Where it falls short, which he 
readily admits, is because the nature of his data creates limitations on his research.19  His 
report draws conclusions on open source data specifically around demographics and 
promotion rates of PLA officers from two data sets.  Whereas inferences can be made, he 
admits future research should strive to improve data collected from earlier periods, 
specifically pre-reform years. 
3.  Confucianism in the PLA 
 In a more recent piece, Mulvenon explains a possible reason why the PLA is 
conducting an educational campaign “designed to cultivate ‘the core values for 
revolutionary soldiers of the contemporary era.’”20  The fact that China is trying to 
incorporate morals into the psyche of the everyday serviceman is worth analysis in that 
the basis of traditional Confucian philosophy was to focus on morality.  The core values 
of contemporary servicemen are meant to counter negative phenomenon that pose a threat 
to the overall power of the Chinese government.21  Specifically, by pushing core values 
                                                 
17 Mulvenon, Professionalization of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps, 23. 
18 Ibid., 32. 




like being loyal, serving the country, and showing devotion to missions, all of which 
show a moral obligation to the state, the military will be better suited to stand up against 
other damaging and corrupt ideals.  Mulvenon stated that “despite the tumultuous 
changes occurring among the population, the overriding goal of the values campaign is to 
facilitate continued Party dominance of the army.”22  One of the implications listed in 
Mulvenon’s piece is that the “core values” campaign in the military “creates a right 
normative narrative about the special values of military organizations (honor, duty, etc.) 
and the traditional Confucian values of China, but ultimately… [are] focused intensely on 
continued Party dominance of the PLA.”23 
 There are other opinions on the restoration of Confucian philosophy in China.  
Alice Miller challenges the contention of some foreign observers that the new goal 
established by way of resolution at the 16th Central Committees Sixth Plenum to 
establish a “harmonious society” signals “a restoration of traditional Confucian concepts 
in CCP political discourse.”24  According to her, there is nothing in common between the 
values of traditional Confucianism and those of a “socialist harmonious society.” 25  Her 
article compares the Hu Jintao’s “8 dos and don’ts” to a 1659 edict called the “6 maxims” 
from the Shunzhi Emperor and states there is little evidence of convergence in concept.26  
She states that Hu Jintao’s ambition in establishing a “harmonious society” seems more 
similar to moral principles pushed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in its last 
decades.27  This article shows that there are criticisms of the argument that the CCP uses 
Confucian philosophies from traditional times to establish morals in government 
compared to what the CCP is supposedly trying to do today in order to establish harmony 
in today’s Chinese society and the PLA. 
                                                 
22 Mulvenon, “Hu Jintao and the ‘Core Values of Military Personnel,’” 5. 
23 Ibid., 6. 




27 Ibid., 9. 
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 David M. Lampton brings up an argument that bears on the character of 
Confucian values and how the PLA is professionalizing.  China’s fourth-generation 
government leaders have focused in on ideational power as a way to broaden national 
strategy.28  Ideational power “does not rely primarily upon material (“money”) rewards 
or coercion (“might”) but rather derives from the intellectual, cultural, spiritual, 
leadership, and legitimacy resources that enhance a nation’s capacity to efficiently define 
and achieve national objectives.”29   
 Whereas previously Confucian’s “rigid hierarchical character” was in many 
aspects used to explain China’s backwardness, today, Lampton argues, much of China’s 
success is attributed to Confucian thought and society based on discipline, an inclination 
to save, the ethic of mutual obligation, the value of education, and networking.30  He 
poses the question, “How can the same Confucian values hold a society back from 
modernization for hundreds of years and then propel it into amazing levels of growth 
over a few decades?”31  Lampton agrees that culture is central and ideology plays a large 
role in China’s reach for power.  But, he argues further that culture and ideology are hard 
to define or measure and that culture involves interaction with other variables 
domestically and in an international context.32  Confucian philosophy has had a central 
role in China’s focus on ideational power, but it is hard to define because of culture and 
its interpretation over time.   
 Finally, Zhang Youyi, a professor from the Philosophy Teaching and Research 
Department at the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Party School states that 
“socialist core values have a close relation to traditional Chinese culture” in that 
“socialist core values have been planted in the fertile soil of traditional Chinese 
                                                 
28 David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2008), 119. 
29 Ibid., 118. 




culture.”33  According to Zhang, traditional culture has evolved over a few thousand 
years and is linked to contemporary traditions that shape Chinese values, morals, 
customs, and other aspects of Chinese life.  Socialist core values, she said, are “the cream 
that remains after the scum is removed from traditional Chinese culture.”34  Confucius’s 
emphasis was on the value of harmony.  As the “intrinsic nature of all things in the 
universe and the basis of existence for all things in this world…it is sheer innovation to 
create a ‘culture of harmony’ suited to the development of modern society.”35  However, 
because “there is no lack of useless things in Chinese culture,” one must discriminate as 
there are ideas from Confucianism that ought to be discarded.36  One must take “the 
dialectical approach of ‘accepting or discarding’ to get hold of the positive factors and 
establish a set of core values that is scientific and generally accepted by the people.”37  
 Zhang advocates that the CCP Central Committee recognize the importance of 
Chinese culture and the need to embrace it in order to define a set of values and build up 
a harmonious society.  Whereas the Cultural Revolution became a movement to 
exterminate traditional culture, which led to adverse consequences and “gave rise to ‘a 
broken generation’ and ‘a Westernized generation,’” the new leadership has exerted great 
efforts to promote Chinese national spirit and provide the opportunity for the Chinese to 
take the traditional Chinese culture seriously.38  Zhang states that today’s Chinese regime 
has put a priority on learning about Chinese culture in order to establishing core values 
requisite to build a harmonious society. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
 The purpose of this research is to determine what values and ideals the PLA is 
using to modernize and then compare those values and ideals to those of early Confucian 
                                                 
33 Youyi Zhang, “PRC: ‘Socialist Core Values’ Rooted in ‘Traditional’ Chinese Culture,” Zhonggua 







times.  If the values and ideals do not compare, what are they comparable to?  My thesis 
first defines what values and ideals the PLA is using to modernize and then compare 
those to the Confucian values and ideals of ancient China.  I discuss how the PLA 
ideology has evolved over the last two decades and define the PLA’s values and ideals of 
today.  Using a comparative approach, I assess whether the PLA’s values and ideals 
today are similar to those of traditional Chinese Confucianism.  I also determine whether 
there are other explanations that better illuminate the significance of the values and ideals 
the PLA is adopting by comparing today’s PLA values and ideals to those of other 
modernizing militaries.  
In order to draw valid conclusions, the thesis draws on open source materials from 
contemporary newspapers, magazines, speeches by Chinese leaders, academic journals, 




II. MODERNIZATION OF THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY 
China has aggressively sought to modernize and professionalize the PLA.  The 
PLA has taken modernization as its central task.  A brief history of the PLA will explain 
how the PLA has developed over the decades in regards to its relationship with the CCP 
as Chinese military doctrine has changed over time.  The PLA plays a major role and has 
influence in Chinese society.  An explanation of the reciprocal relationship between the 
PLA and Chinese citizens sheds light on the CCP’s reliance of the PLA being one of the 
faces of the Chinese government to the Chinese citizens and the need for the PLA to be 
loyal to China’s Communist party.  China has repeatedly stated that its military has 
embarked in a revolution of military affairs.  China’s RMA has shown the PLA has not 
only pursued technological advances to fight a “limited war in high-tech conditions” but 
also a systematic reform of its military doctrine.  One doctrinal reform is the 
incorporation of ideals and core military values to guide the way a PLA soldier thinks as 
the Chinese military modernizes.  
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PLA 
The PLA has existed from its beginning under the tight control of the CPC.  Since 
its beginning, there have been four major shifts in PLA military doctrine due to changes 
in threat, leadership, and political reform. 
1.  How the PLA Got Its Name 
The PLA was officially established on 1 August 1927.  The PLA was initially 
called the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army during the revolutionary struggle 
against the Kuomintang.  The army was composed of peasants as its main body who 
subjected themselves to the CCP leaders for direction reflecting a desire for tight control 
of the army by the CCP.39  As a result of the Sanwan Reorganization in September 1927, 
the CCP reestablished the basic organization of the military by placing a Party branch in 
each company, thereby, guaranteeing the Party’s absolute leadership at the grass-roots 
                                                 
39 PLA Press, The Cross-Century Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Beijing: PLA Press, 2005), 3. 
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level throughout the armed forces.  A fundamental milestone characterizing the 
relationship between the CCP and the Red Army occurred at the Gutian Congress in 
December 1929.  The Gutian Congress Resolution specified the nature of the Red Army.   
The Red Army of China is an armed group to carry out revolutionary 
political tasks.  Besides launching wars to annihilate the enemy military 
power, the Red Army shall take up important tasks such as spreading 
publicity among the masses, organizing the general public and helping 
them set up revolutionary regimes as well as Party organizations.40 
In 1946, after a short period when the CCP and the Kuomintang combined forces 
to defeat the Japanese, war again broke out between the CCP and the Kuomintang 
Nationalists.  The CCP charged the PLA to “liberate the people and make them the 
masters of their own country.”41  When the Chinese Civil War began in 1946, the CCP’s 
Red Army was renamed as the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.  The name has since 
been used till now.       
2. The Shifting Doctrines of the PLA 
Since the 1930s, the PLA has evolved and encompassed a wide array of doctrines 
categorized into four phases: the “people’s war” from 1935 to 1979 which included the 
Soviet Modernization Period in the 1950s, the “people’s war under modern conditions” 
from 1979 to 1985, “limited war” from 1985 to 1991, and “limited war under high-
technology conditions” from 1991 to present.42  The changes in doctrine due to a change 
in threat, leadership, and political reform caused the size and capability of the PLA to 
fluctuate over the last eight decades. 
The people’s war doctrine capitalized on a large number of people fighting under 
harsh conditions.  The PLA defended the mainland with ground forces from an advanced 
military by taking advantage of a large population and land mass employing speed, 
deception, surprise, and stratagem against the enemy.43  Through attrition, the enemy 
                                                 
40 PLA Press, The Cross-Century Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 4.  
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would wear down as they were drawn further away from supplies and reinforcements.  
Mao military doctrine emphasized the role of man over weapons, using the population as 
the fighting force, and incorporating guerrilla tactics to overcome the enemy until there 
was an accumulation of combat power and the transition could be made to conventional 
military operations.44  Relying mainly on the peasant population to field the army meant 
a compromise in training and deep seated education in military warfare for the average 
military person. 
The “people’s war under modern conditions” was a shift from the former due in 
large part to the realization that even with limited access to western military technology 
the PLA was “inadequately armed, poorly equipped, deficient in communications, 
lacking in logistic support, and insufficiently trained for complex operations” as 
demonstrated in China’s disastrous invasion of Vietnam in 1979.45  Chinese manpower 
superiority was grossly overestimated, which showed with Chinese casualties of 26,000 
killed in action with another 37,000 wounded.  The PLA’s technological backwardness 
fell short of the Chinese leadership’s expectations.  The PLA’s combat failures showed 
the PLA was not prepared for war against a modern military because they were 
overwhelmed by a smaller, less advanced, and war-weary Vietnamese force.46  During 
this phase, the CCP was collaborating more with the West and relied upon western 
technology to modernize while still holding onto the large scale people’s war doctrine. 
Phase three, the transition to “limited war” starting in 1985 is the baseline for the 
current Chinese military modernization.  This phase posed a fundamental shift in Chinese 
strategic warfare.  In June 1985, Deng Xiaoping, the chairman of the CCP and PRC’s 
Central Military Commission (CMC) put forward a new assessment of China’s security 
situation.  Deng argued that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was likely to 
start a war and the chances of Soviet massive attack against China, he argued, were 
fading.47  Instead of providing a people’s war, China must instead be prepared to fight 
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“local limited wars” on its periphery.  Such wars would have to be won quickly and 
decisively to prevent escalation into prolonged conflicts.  Limited wars would be fought 
with modern military technology—weapons, not men, win wars.  This dramatic change in 
doctrine emphasized professionalism, technological upgrade, rejuvenation, and 
downsizing of the PLA as the threat of nuclear war was replaced with a threat of local 
wars.   
Phase four, “limited war under high-technology conditions” began in 1991.  
Operation Desert Storm and the Gulf War made a significant impression on the Chinese 
leadership.  PLA analysts mistakenly believed that the United States and its coalition 
would be bogged down in a ground war with Iraq’s massive ground force. Instead, the 
United States surgically destroyed Iraq’s military in a matter of days with almost no 
casualties.  Operation Desert Storm and the near flawless execution of that military 
campaign by a coalition force showed the PLA high command many of its own militaries 
deficiencies48  Perhaps one of the most important lessons learned concerned weaponry.  
“Breaking with the cardinal Maoist tenet that man was the most important element in 
warfare, PLA writings began to evince a new appreciation of the role of weapons and 
technology.”49  Although the third phase, “local limited war,” placed importance on 
technology over man, the fourth phase placed a greater emphasis on research and 
development of broad ranged and advanced weapons and technologies.   
High priority was subsequently placed on mastering electronic warfare 
and electronic countermeasures (particularly air and naval 
countermeasures); improving ballistic missile production and precision-
guided munitions (PGMs); building satellites, early warning and command 
systems, and advanced communication relay stations; investigating laser 
technologies; developing artificial intelligence and information warfare 
skills; improving avionics and mastering in-flight refueling; and 
developing anti-ballistic missile systems.50 
In addition to lessons from Operation Desert Storm being implemented into PLA 
doctrine, PLA analysts put more emphasis on U.S. military journals and officials 
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discussing the “revolution in military affairs” (RMA).  There are a multitude of aspects to 
RMA, but the baseline “is the application of information technology to the battlefield and 
contemporary warfare.”51    
The shifts in PLA doctrine from the 1930s emphasizing huge numbers of 
untrained men fighting a large war of attrition compared to today’s doctrine of focusing 
on short, local wars fought by trained men with state-of-the-art technology shows how 
the last 80 years of the PLA’s evolution was influenced by a change in threat, leadership, 
and political reform.      
B. LEADERSHIP OF THE PLA 
The command structure of the PLA is unique and warrants some explanation to 
understand how policy is generated and implemented.  Today’s PLA leadership is 
modeled much like that of the Soviet organizational model implemented during the 1950s 
when China and the Soviet Union were close allies.  The relationship between PLA 
officers and CCP officials also offers unique perspective as to what influences military 
modernization policy.  As more CCP leaders do not have the same personal war-fighting 
type experiences with the PLA like that of Mao and Deng, some believe there is a greater 
separation between the CCP and military organizations possibly implicating more 
potential for military intervention of the PLA in Chinese politics.  Because there is more 
of a personal relationship separation between PLA and CCP leaders, CCP leaders would 
be more vulnerable to yield to PLA senior leader demands in an effort for the CCP to 
sustain the loyalty of the PLA.  There is no evidence that the CCP yields to PLA leaders’ 
demands but the PLA does have more influence.  The separation between PLA and CCP 
leadership is evident in the trend that there are increasingly fewer PLA leaders on the 
Politburo (compared to only a few years ago). 
1. Command and Control 
Two Central Military Commissions play a role in PLA decision-making power.  
One commission is part of the CCP and the other is part of the state.  The twin CMC’s 
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have authority but high-level decision-making power comes from the Central Committee 
Politburo.52  Since the early 1980s, the Chairman of the CMC for the CCP and the PRC 
(state) have been the same person meaning there are two different commissions but 
effectively the CMC has been the same body.  Article 19 of China’s 1997 National 
Defense Law states that “the armed forces of the PRC are subject to the leadership of the 
Communist Party, and CCP organizations in the armed forces shall conduct activities in 
accordance with the CCP Constitution.”  Article 10 states that the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress decides on the proclamation of a state of war and general 
mobilization of the PLA.  Ultimately, command and control of the PLA resides with the 
President of the People’s Republic of China as stated in Article 11 that says he is the one 
who declares war and issues the mobilization orders.  
Each chairman of the CMC had a different personal background with the PLA.  
The first generation chairman was Mao Zedong (1935–1976).  Mao did not receive a 
formal education, but he had a strong military background as a result of the bloody wars 
during the Chinese revolution and with Japan.  The leaders that surrounded him were 
survivors of the Long March who were also mainstream military minded leaders.  The 
second generation leader was Deng Xiaoping (1981–1989).  Like Mao, Deng was not 
formally educated and had a strong military influence due to his service in the PLA.  
However, Deng was more open to new ideas and as mentioned earlier was responsible for 
major changes in PLA military doctrine.  The third generation of CMC leadership was 
led by Jiang Zemin (1989–2004).  Jiang had a formal education and a background in 
business and politics—not the military.  Consequently, many of those close to him also 
had formal educations and little if any experience with the PLA.  The fourth generation 
CMC leader is the current Chairman of the CMC, Hu Jintao (2004 to present).  Hu was 
barely born at the time of the end of the Chinese Communist Revolution in 1949 and has 
not been a member of the PLA.  Instead, his background is as an engineer, and he worked 
in construction before he entered the major political scene.  As chairmen have changed, 
the background and experiences they had with the PLA before and during their 
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appointment influenced PLA military doctrine and policy.  With each chairman the PLA 
has been re-shaped and reformed to deal with the challenges unique to that time.  
The organizational structure of today’s PLA is much like that of the Soviet model 
implemented during the 1950s when China established a close relationship with the 
Soviet Union.  Before 1950, the Red Army used German and Soviet military models.  
After the Chinese communists took power, the PLA relied heavily on Soviet military 
advisors embedded at different levels of the military and gradually leaned more to the 
Soviet model due to the heavy Soviet influence.  Today’s PLA command and control is 
strongly influenced by a Central Military Commission, which sets policies and gives 
directions to be executed by four General Headquarters Departments: the General Staff 
Department (GSD), General Logistics Department (GLD), General Political Department 
(GPD), and the General Armaments Department (GAD).53  Military units are assigned to 
regions and districts according to the different services.54  The PLA has an army, navy, 
and air force, but the army is by far the biggest due to China’s previous overarching 
doctrine of protecting the mainland.     
Many ranking PLA officers have their background in ground forces because they 
trained and experienced their formative years in the army when the use of ground forces 
dominated Chinese military doctrine.55  The ground-force oriented approach to war held 
firm by previous PLA leaders meant that “until recently many have not been exposed to 
some of the intricacies of modern, joint warfare involving land, air, sea, space, and 
electromagnetic components.”56  However, as PLA doctrine changes to emphasize more 
jointness, even conservative ground force leaders accept the fact that a single-service, 
land-based operation would be and exception to the rule for any future war against 
China.57  
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2.  The Relationship of the PLA Leadership with the CCP  
There is a symbiotic civil-military relationship between the PLA and the CCP.  
This relationship has been sustained over time but there have been different periods when 
the CCP has tried to exert more control and times when the PLA has sought more 
autonomy.  Harry Harding, a political scientist and Chinese specialist, noted “that this 
fluctuation correlates to the strength or weakness of the party-state.”58  The PLA tended 
to act as a corporate bureaucratic lobby when the party-state was strong and acted as a 
political arbiter between the competing factions when the party-state was weak.  In the 
periods 1954–1959, 1974–1975, and 1982–1989 the PLA carefully sought to increase its 
autonomy from the CCP. 59  In contrast, the PLA in 1967, 1976, and 1989, sought to 
exert a greater role in high-level party affairs.  However, no matter which way the 
fluctuations have gone, at no time has the PLA tried to seek full autonomy from the CCP 
or vice versa.  The PLA has sought greater independence in areas it considers fully in its 
domain--training, military doctrine, force structure, military education, and national 
security.60 
Although the number of PLA leaders on the Politburo has decreased over recent 
years, overall PLA influence in the Politburo and its Standing Committee has increased.61  
The military is in a strong position and can influence civilian-military affairs because the 
CCP is dependent on their support.  PLA leaders see themselves as stewards of China’s 
honor and territorial interests and officers function in a concentrated nationalistic 
environment.  Officers are continuously indoctrinated with nationalistic values and are 
instilled with a sense of mission as protectors of these values.62  For most, the PLA’s 
absolute subordination to the party and party leaders is not in doubt, but today’s Chinese 
military can influence political leadership because military leaders have leverage over the 
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party leadership who need PLA support for special bureaucratic interests and regime 
stability.63  As more CCP leaders have less personal work experience with the PLA like 
that of Mao and Deng, there is a greater separation between the CCP and military 
organizations.  This raises the potential for greater PLA influence in Chinese politics if 
CCP leadership yields to PLA leadership demands in order to maintain PLA loyalty to 
the Party.  Although PLA influence is possibly higher, actual appointments of PLA 
leadership to high Party positions has been on the decline as demonstrated by fewer PLA 
leaders on the Politburo (compared to only a few years ago).  Currently there are no PLA 
members of the nine-member Political Bureau Standing committee of the Central 
Committee and only two uniformed PLA officers on the full Political Bureau composed 
of 24 members.64  In addition, there has been a generational change among PLA 
commanders who increasingly are more concerned about overseeing long-term 
modernization of the PLA than being involved with politics.65       
C. INFLUENCE OF THE PLA IN CHINESE SOCIETY 
The PLA plays a major role in Chinese society.  There is a reciprocal relationship 
between the PLA and the people of China.  The PLA provides disaster relief, medical 
services, man-hours for infrastructure buildup, and many other services.  At the same 
time, the people provide support to the PLA.  In many ways, the PLA is the public face of 
the Chinese government to the people.  
1. The PLA Supports the People and the People Support the PLA 
The CCP does all it can to promote the PLA as a people’s army.  Especially since 
the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, the PLA has thoroughly undertaken the task to 
rebuild ties between society and the military.  With the aim of portraying the PLA in 
good light to Chinese citizens and the world, the PLA is engaged in supporting society 
down to the community level, in disaster relief operations, in domestic security 
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operations, and in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKO).66  CCP 
propaganda makes it clear that a major responsibility of the PLA is to support the people 
by protecting the mainland and the people through providing security against threats to 
Chinese leadership and people of China. 
One way the PLA supports the people is through its active support and 
participation in national construction.67  The PLA actively supports and participates in 
national construction.  The GSD and the GPD have directed each PLA soldier to devote 
at least eight days a year to national defense construction assignments.68  The PLA has 
been involved with infrastructure construction projects all over China but especially in 
the “rust belt” (northeast) and more rural regions in support of national economic 
development.  PLA units from each of the services have engineering units that contribute 
heavy machinery and technical expertise and manpower to construct “buildings, 
highways, bridges, airports, ports, pipelines, and railroads, and laying many miles of 
optical fiber cable, often through remote areas.”69 Propaganda aside, another reason the 
PLA is engaged in infrastructure projects is that most infrastructure supported by the 
PLA is dual use; the projects also have military application in time of war.  Not only does 
the construction support the people, it also provides PLA units with expertise and training 
as well as modernizes the PRC’s infrastructure for any future war. 
The PLA also influences Chinese society by supplying the local populace in 
impoverished areas with medical care.  The “Notice on Military Hospitals Supporting 
Civilian Hospitals in Western Provinces” issued by the PLA GLD in 2001 required PLA 
hospitals to support civilian hospitals.70  Regularly, there are images produced of PLA 
medical personnel providing care for civilians and PLA soldiers donating blood in 
Chinese military media to show PLA support of the people and maximize positive 
influence.  During the sever acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) crises (2002 to 2003), 
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even after the PLA publicly downplayed the severity of the outbreak and hid evidence of  
the spread of the epidemic, once the political decision was made to tackle the problem, 
the PLA was called on to play an significant role in the crisis.  The PLA immediately 
implemented policies to manage and treat the disease across China but also provided the 
world with a visible example of how the PLA positively contributed to helping society.  
For example, the PLA built and manned a hospital near Beijing in only a few days to care 
for SARS patients.71     
The PLA also supports the people by being involved in disaster relief operations. 
A recent case in point was the PLA activity in support of the 12 May 2008 earthquake in 
Wenchuan County, Sichuan Province, which measured 8.0 on the Richter scale.  
According to the 2008 White Paper on National Defense, 
…the PLA and the PAPF deployed 146,000 troops, mobilized 75,000 
militiamen and reservists, flew over 4,700 sorties/time (including the use 
of helicopters) and employed 533,000 vehicles/time in the relief effort. 
They rescued 3,338 survivors, evacuated 1.4 million local residents, and 
transported, airlifted and air-dropped 1.574 million tons of relief materials. 
They sent 210 teams of medical workers, psychotherapists, and sanitation 
and epidemic prevention specialists, and treated 1.367 million injured 
people. The troops strictly observed discipline, and kept detailed records 
of hundreds of millions of yuan in cash and large quantities of valuables 
recovered from the debris, all of which was handed over to the owners or 
relevant departments of local governments.72 
There is a reciprocal relationship between the people and the PLA.  Under the 
“Double Support Work,” it defines the reciprocal relationship as requiring “civilian work 
units to support the military and to provide favored treatment terms to families of military 
professionals in service and…military work units to support the civilian government and 
to love civilian people.”73  The PLA “loves” the people by performing the services and 
security mentioned above.  The civilians show their support to the military by giving 
preferential treatment to soldiers and their families, as well as help demobilized soldiers 
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find employment and make available various types of support to military units in the 
area.  The PLA is visible in Chinese society and influences the Chinese people as they 
provide support and security for them. 
In many ways the Party tries to convey to the world and the people of China that 
the PLA is the public face of the Chinese government.  Whereas the PLA’s positive 
influences for the people are dual use and benefit the PLA in preparing for and fighting a 
war, the Propaganda from the Party continually shows that the PLA supports the CCP 
and Chinese people by providing security and a variety of services which influence the 
Chinese society.   
D.  MODERNIZING THE PLA 
Beginning in the 1980s, and especially in the 1990s, the PLA accelerated its 
program to upgrade in a sustained and comprehensive fashion.74  Practically abandoning 
the Maoist doctrine of “people’s war,” the PLA began to modernize to prepare for the 
more realistic wartime scenario of limited engagements with modern forces using 
conventional strategies.  Although the PLA has major military deficiencies, the PLA is 
determined to modernize and build a military “commensurate with its long-term aim of 
gaining preeminent status in East Asia and a pivotal global role.”75  Dr. Paul Godwin 
stated that in response to changing requirements,  
the past 20 years have seen the focus of china’s national  military strategy 
shift from continental to peripheral defense and maritime force projection.  
PLA operational doctrine has changed from defense in depth to forward 
defense, force projection and grappling with the implications of the RMA 
and Informational Warfare (IW) as its strategists contemplate twenty-first-
century warfare.76 
There has been a comprehensive shift in the last few decades that describe the 
PLA modernization.  The PLA is not just out to buy and/or acquire new weapons 
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systems, there has also been major reform in education and training, an emphasis to 
restore professionalism in the PLA, and reform to reduce the number of PLA personnel 
and emphasize quality over quantity.  
1. Elements of Modernization 
According to Dennis Blasko, there were a number of elements of PLA 
modernization in addition to the acquisition of better war fighting equipment.  Blasko 
stated that there would be changes in force structure, changes in the personnel system, 
constant doctrinal change to prepare the PLA to engage and win in “local wars under 
modern high technology conditions,” improvements in training, a transformation of PLA 
logistics system  to support joint operations, reorganization of the professional military 
education (PME) system, enhancing the standard of living for PLA members, reforming 
the structure and missions of the PLA reserves and militia, and modifying the PLA’s 
interaction with society.77  These elements show a comprehensive shift from the previous 
PLA focus to have a large military able to fight a war of attrition deep in China’s 
hinterland.   
The 2004 White Paper on National Defense emphasizes “informationalization” as 
a major focus of modernization.  The paper says,  
In its modernization drive, the PLA takes informationalization as its 
orientation and strategic focus. By adopting the general approach of giving 
priority to real needs, making practical innovations, valuing talented 
personnel, and achieving informationalization by leaps and bounds, the 
PLA is actively engaged in the research and practice of 
informationalization.78 
The 2008 White paper on National Defense is more specific how the PLA is to 
use informationalization to modernize the Chinese military.  It says, 
To modernize China's national defense in line with both the national 
conditions of China and the trend of military development in the world by 
adhering to the policy of coordinating military and economic 
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development, and improve the operational capabilities of self-defense 
under the conditions of informationalization.79  
2. Education and Training 
While informationalization is vital to PLA modernization, having a personnel 
core capable of fighting an informationalized war is also vital to PLA modernization. 
Military training is regarded as the basic approach to further the comprehensive 
development of the PLA.  The PLA is working to reform training programs, methods, 
management and support, and create a scientific system for military training in conditions 
of informationization.80 
The PLA is systematically upgrading its methods of training as part of its 
modernization.  Dennis Blasko, Philip Klapakis, and John Corbett, Jr. identify four 
characteristics the PLA has undertaken to reform training and education.  First, training 
has become more experimental in nature.  Selected military units experiment in different 
aspects of modern war and lessons-learned are analyzed after the unit participates on 
exercises.  Small units are initially chosen to test new weapons and techniques and 
gradually larger units are used for study.81  Second, more emphasis is being placed on 
joint operations and combined arms with an expectation for standardization compared to 
before the Gulf War.82  Third, there has been more effort to develop low-cost training 
techniques, computerized war games, simulators, and command post exercises to practice 
scenarios without having to put military forces on the battlefield.83  Fourth, the PLA has 
continued to emphasize the importance of man over machine in spite of the emphasis of 
studying high technology warfare.84  In 1990, Jiang Zemin stated, “Though we’re unable 
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to develop all high-technology weapons and equipment within a short period of time, we 
must train qualified personnel first, for we would rather let our qualified personnel wait 
for equipment that the other way round.”85 
In August 2003, the CMC authorized the “Strategic Project for Talented People,” 
which proposed that in one or two decades the PLA sought to have a core of command 
officers capable of directing informationalized wars and have “informationalized” armed 
forces.86  The PLA wanted to see an improvement in the quality of personnel—both the 
quality of leadership and the education and training of the average soldier, airman, or 
sailor.  Wang Xinjun, a Chinese military expert who helped draft the 2004 white paper on 
China’s national defense, stated, “Only by improving the training of human resources, 
especially the high-caliber ones, can the Chinese military keep up with the worldwide 
revolution of military affairs.”87  The intent of the project is to produce a cadre of 
scientists capable of managing the development of weapons and equipment, a cadre of 
technical specialists with knowledge of high-tech weaponry performance, and a cadre of 
non-commissioned officers with proficiency in using the weapons and equipment at hand.    
To modernize PLA leadership, more institutional education and practice with 
units has been the focus for commanding officers. 
Various measures are being taken to step up efforts to train commanding 
officers for joint operations, such as institutional education, on-the-job 
study and rotation of posts. Incorporating joint operations into the whole 
training process, the PLA carefully distinguishes between the training 
tasks of educational institutions of different levels and types, and couples 
institutional education with training in units, so as to establish a system for 
training joint operations commanding officers which emphasizes both 
institutional education and practice in units.88  
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In 2007, the Ministry of Education and the PLA’s General Political Department 
co-sponsored a conference addressing training PLA officers in higher-education 
institutions.  As of 2008, there were 117 colleges and universities with defense 
students.89 
3. Restoration of Professionalism 
Another part of PLA modernization is an increased effort for PLA 
professionalization.  The Maoist legacy during and after the Cultural Revolution 
especially hurt the PLA officer corps.  The Maoist radicals viewed the officer corps as the 
“citadel of antagonistic values and attitudes” and according to Ellis Joffe “was the chief 
target of their crusade against military professionalism.90  During the Mao years military 
involvement in Chinese politics lead to rivalries and sectarian struggles which left the 
officer corps “bloated, over-aged, incompetent and incapable of adjusting to new 
times.”91  Since the 1980s, there has been a major push to restore PLA professionalism.  
The PLA’s high command has directed efforts to modernize the military and 
professionalize the officer corps by producing officers who are “younger in age, better 
educated, and professionally competent.”92  From recruitment to retirement, policy 
reform has put the PLA’s officer corps on a whole new footing.   
Military Academies have been the center of the campaign to professionalize the 
PLA.  Xiao Ke, commandant of the PLA Military Academy in 1983 elaborated on the 
relationship of the professional solider and academies when he said,  
The relationship between the academies and troops is like that between the 
head and body of a dragon while performing a dragon dance.  If the 
dragon head performs well, its long body will soar aloft and dance freely 
in the air.  In the course of building a modern, regular and revolutionary 
army, the building of colleges and academies is the key link that 
determines the building of the army.93 
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The goal to integrate military studies led to the establishment of the National 
Defense University in 1985, which was formed by merging the PLA Political Academy, 
the PLA logistics Academy, and the PLA Military Academy. 
Today, new officers are required to be graduates of military academies and must 
pass examinations set down by the Ministry of Education.  Age limits and professional 
military education (PME) requirements also raise standards for PLA officers.  The 
proportion of PME graduates, or college-educated officers, rose from 1 percent in 1982 to 
58 percent by 1987 at the army level, 2 percent to 66 percent at the division level, and 2 
percent to 41 percent at the regiment level.94  As reforms from the 1980s progressed, the 
high-level PME curricula become more specialized.  China’s senior military schools are 
becoming increasingly professional and the PLA’s higher rates of education are 
enhancing the office corps.95 
However, there is a great modernization challenge the PLA is trying to overcome 
in its enlisted ranks.  Because the PLA has an annual conscription and demobilization 
cycle in the fall, the PLA is always confronted with a situation in which a fourth of to a 
third of its troops are always first-year soldiers.  This puts a large stress on the officer 
corps to professionalize the whole force and “probably limits the level at which tactical 
and operational proficiency can be achieved.”96 
4. The PLA Reduction in Force 
Another area of reform has been reducing the size of the PLA.  In 1982, the PLA 
had more than 4.2 million men, an estimated 20 percent than the number of men before 
the Cultural Revolution.97  The large PLA had become top-heavy, cumbersome, wasteful, 
and inefficient.98  After the Cultural Revolution, the reforms associated with troop 
reduction were established in order to make the PLA more competent and efficient.  PLA 
leadership wanted to substitute quality for quantity.  Since the 1980s the PLA has twice 
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reduced forces by more than 1.5 million.  In 2003, the PLA again decided to downsize 
personnel by 200,000 members by 2005 to maintain force strength of 2.3 million men and 
women.99  Restructuring aimed to optimize force structures and have a better quality 
force.       
E. REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS 
China has repeatedly stated its military has embarked on a revolution of military 
affairs.  After defining RMA, this section will discuss what the Chinese military is doing 
to undertake RMA. 
1. What is RMA? 
Andrew Krepinevich defines RMA as “what occurs when the application of new 
technologies into a significant number of military systems combines with innovative 
operational concepts and organizational adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters the 
character and conduct of conflict (emphasis added).”100  Krepinevich describes RMA as 
having four elements: technical change, systems development, operational innovation, 
and organizational adaptation.101  The occurrence of RMA not only incorporates 
technological innovations into a military, although such innovations definitely add to 
RMA, but also incorporates tactical and doctrinal changes as well as political, social, 
economic order different from the past.  RMA does not pertain to why states fight, but 
rather implicates how they fight.  RMA is creating decisive asymmetry to beat an 
adversary in a conflict. 
2. China’s RMA  
China’s RMA is discussed in the 2004, 2006, and 2008 defense white papers.   In 
the 2004 paper, it says that the worldwide RMA is gaining momentum and the form of 
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war is changing from mechanization to informationalization.102  Further, the paper states 
that the confrontation of systems has become the principle feature on the battlefield and 
that the world’s major states are making readjustments in technology and doctrine as 
asymmetrical, non-contiguous and non-linear operations have become the important 
patterns of contemporary operations.  China concedes in the 2004 paper that as other 
states continue to transform their militaries, the generation gap in technology between 
informationalization and mechanization is widening and the military imbalance 
worldwide continues to increase.    
In the 2006 defense white paper, it states that “to effectively fulfill its historic 
mission in the new stage of the new century, the PLA is speeding up the revolution in 
military affairs with Chinese features and enhancing in an all-round way its capabilities 
of defensive operations under conditions of informationization national defense and 
modernization.”103  Chinese national defense and military modernization is a requirement 
to keep up with the trend of global revolution and development in military affairs.  The 
2006 paper says that China will not engage in an arms race but based on steady economic 
development the defense “will take the scientific development outlook as an important 
guiding principle for the building of national defense and military affairs, vigorously 
advance the revolution in military affairs with Chinese features, and strive to realize an 
all-round, coordinated and sustainable development in our country's national defense and 
military capabilities.”104 
In the 2008 defense paper, it states that “the PLA has accelerated RMA with 
Chinese characteristics, and pushed forward its military, political, logistical and 
equipment work in a coordinated way, in an effort to achieve sound and rapid 
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development.  The PLA has taken modernization as its central task by comprehensively 
advancing revolutionization, modernization, and regularization.” 105  
China’s PLA is undertaking RMA by aggressively pursuing technological 
advances and systematically reforming its military doctrine to become a leaner, smarter, 
efficient, and more competent fighting force in order to be able to fight a limited war in 
high-tech conditions.   
F.  VALUES AND IDEALS OF THE PLA 
Hu Jintao has described each of the PLA’s five core military values.  After 
discussing each of the core military values, this section discusses the relationship 
between the PLA’s values and the overarching ideal of “putting the Chinese people first” 
and why the PLA has core values.   
1. The Five Core Military Values 
On 30 December 2008, Hu Jintao listed the five core military values of the PLA 
for the contemporary era as “being loyal to the party, deeply cherishing the people, 
serving the country, showing devotion to missions, and upholding honor.”106 Hu 
explained each value. To be loyal to the party is to “consciously uphold the Party’s 
absolute leadership over the armed forces, hold aloft the great banner of socialism with 
Chinese characteristics, fortify ideals and convictions about socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, and resolutely obey the party’s orders at all times and under all 
circumstances.”107   
The core value of cherishing the people means to “faithfully practice the basic 
aim of serving the people wholeheartedly, put the people’s interests above and ahead of 
                                                 
105 Chinese National Defense in 2008, “Reform and Development of the PLA,” 
http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227_12.htm/ (accessed April 13, 2010). 
106 Xu Zhuangshi, “(Military Affairs) Hu Jintao Calls for Vigorously Cultivating the Core Values of 
‘Being Loyal to the Party, Deeply Cherishing the People, Serving the Country, Showing Devotion to 
Missions, and upholding Honor’ for Contemporary Revolutionary Soldiers,” Xinhua Domestic Service  in 
Chinese, December 30, 2008, 
https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display
/CPP20081230172001?searchKey=936347&rpp=10&index=8 (accessed April 14, 2010). 
107 Ibid. 
 31
everything else, always preserve the people’s army’s political character, cast in one’s lot 
and share weal and woe with the masses, and show selfless devotion to the people.”108 
Hu explained the value to “serve the country” means “to vigorously promote the 
patriotic spirit; closely link an individual’s future and destiny with the country’s future 
and destiny; resolutely defend the country’s sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity,  
as well as the state power based on the people’s democratic dictatorship; and make 
contributions to building a prosperous, strong, democratic, civilized, and harmonious 
modern socialist country.”109 
To “demonstrate devotion to missions” on “must perform the sacred duties of 
revolutionary solders, cherish the armed forces, be proficient in military skills, cherish 
and show dedication to one’s work, not shrink from making sacrifice, be valiant an 
skillful in battle, and resolutely perform the historical missions entrusted by the party and 
the people to the military at a new phase in the century.”110 
The last core military value, to “uphold honor,” Hu said was to “consciously 
cherish and defend the honor of the country, the military, and military members; put 
honor ahead of one’s life; consciously practice the concept of socialist honor and 
disgrace; promote the spirit of revolutionary heroism, and collectivism; improve quality 
and develop in an all-around way; strive for first-rate results and render meritorious 
service; uphold the integrity of a revolutionary; and strictly observe military 
discipline.”111 
2. Why the PLA Has Core Values 
Hu has emphasized that the five core values must be cultivated in all the facets of 
China’s military buildup and modernization so officers and soldiers will understand and 
accept them as the most basic core values that reflect the relations between officers in 
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China’s military and the communist party, the people, state, and the armed forces.112  The 
five core values are to guide the way a soldier thinks and to achieve the ideal of putting 
the people’s interests above anything else as the military modernizes.   
Gong Fangbin, a senior researcher at the Academy of Military Science in Beijing 
said the five core values are consistent with the key traditions of the PLA when it was 
founded during the revolution of contemporary China.  Gong stated, “It has been the most 
important belief since the army’s founding that soldiers should serve the people 
wholeheartedly and put people’s interests above everything.”113   
Chinese leaders know the world is closely watching the Chinese army as the PLA 
modernizes and China enters the international arena and China has more at stake in 
international affairs.  China’s status is growing and shares more global responsibilities.  
The PLA is opening up to the outside world and has thus adopted a mindset to strengthen 
the loyalty to its core values.  PLA analysts say the army must remain unshaken amid 
disturbances and adhere to the key principles of the Chinese servicemen as the world 
changes.  In January 2009, while addressing the PLA Hu said, “All servicemen should 
strengthen their spiritual pillar and foster the core values.  New historic conditions have 
required the army to hold on to these core values after years of practice and have given 
new meaning to these values today.”114 
G.  CONCLUSION 
The PLA’s history and change in military doctrine over the decades shows the 
tight control and influence of the CCP over the military.  The PLA has tremendous 
influence in Chinese society and the CCP relies on the PLA in some aspects to be the 
face of the Chinese government.  The CCP is heavily reliant on the PLA for support and 
loyalty as well as provide domestic and international security as China develops into a 
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great power.  China’s RMA has shown the PLA not only pursued technological advances 
to fight a limited war in high-tech conditions but also incorporated systematic reform of 
its military doctrine.  By implementing the ideal of putting the people first and the five 
core military values of being loyal to the party, deeply cherishing the people, serving the 
country, showing devotion to missions, and upholding honor, the members of China’s 
modernizing military will understand the relations between members of China’s military 
and the communist party, the people, state, and the armed forces.  China’s leaders know 
the world is watching as the PLA modernizes.  Chinese leaders realize as China becomes 
an economic leader the pressure will be for the PLA to open up to the outside world.  The 
PLA’s ideals and values help ensure the military has a solid foundation, as well as 
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III. THE IDEALS OF CONFUCIANISM 
This chapter begins with a focus on the roots of Confucian philosophy and defines 
the traditional ideals and values of Confucianism.  Next, a comparison is made between 
the ideals and values of Confucianism and what the PLA currently promotes as its ideals 
and core military values.  Discussed are the similarities and differences of Confucian 
ideals and values and those the PLA has incorporated into its military modernization, as 
well as why possibly the PLA chose to incorporate the ideals and values it did.     
A. CONFUCIAN BEGINNINGS 
Confucius lived in a tumultuous time of Chinese history.  A man not of noble 
birth, Confucius presented ideas and an ideology to Chinese courts in an effort to restore 
order in society.  His ideology was one of many of the Warring States period and, 
although not readily accepted, has become one of mankind’s oldest philosophies.    
1. Who was Confucius? 
Kong Qiu, known as “Kongzi” and “Kongfuzi” by his followers, lived from 551–
479 BC.  Kongfuzi translated to mean “the Master Kong,” was Latinized to “Confucius” 
by Jesuit priests in China in the 16th and 17th century.  It is generally accepted that 
Confucius was a citizen of Lu located near the east coast of China.  At an early age, he 
was a tutor and teacher for the children of the de facto ruler of Lu, Meng Xizi, where he 
taught ritual etiquette observed at state religious ceremonies.115  Confucius traveled to 
different northern Chinese courts in hope that rulers would make his ideas the basis of 
state policy.  After being largely ignored, he returned to Lu and was appointed as a police 
commissioner, a minor post in the government.  After only a few years, Confucius again 
traveled in search for the opportunity to influence courts with his ideas.  Upon his return, 
at this time approximately 70 years old, Confucius devoted his time to editing classical 
texts.116  As a philosopher of an early era, the ideas of Confucius, today known as 
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Confucianism, were from a man who lived in a tumultuous time in Chinese history.  
After his death, his ideals and virtues were elaborated upon by his followers.  However, 
Confucius’ ideology of striving for morality did not become official in any Chinese court 
until centuries later under the Han dynasty in 136 BC. 
2. The Hundred Schools 
Confucianism was a philosophy that evolved from the Warring States Period.  
When the Zhou succeeded the Shang dynasty, there were several centuries of relative 
stability.  As the Zhou dynasty’s strength began to decline, the dynasty disintegrated into 
several competing small states, each bidding for power.  In the context of political 
confusion, social unrest, and economic uncertainty, the political chaos and endless 
warfare stimulated intellectual examination of the era’s troubles.  Several “schools” of 
thought emerged as solutions to the troubles of the day.   
By 360 BC, the Qin began to emerge as the strongest state because of its 
favorable location, fertile soil, and economic reforms drawing in peasantry, which 
increased the Qin’s population and enhanced its agricultural potential.117   As the Qin 
increased its capacity to mobilize greater armies, the dynasty became even more powerful 
and began to assimilate other states.  By 221 BC, the ruler of Qin controlled the whole 
region, united China, and declared himself the first Emperor of the Qin.  The Qin regime 
was governed by a harsh code that rewarded success and punished failure.  Talent was 
emphasized as criterion for advancement in government instead of noble birth.  This 
period of unification was critical in Chinese history because it began to facilitate an 
atmosphere that spurred ideological thought, established cultural norms, and standardized 
law, a weights and measures system, and currency for trade.118   
The laws of the Qin were established under the tenets of Legalism.  Legalists 
advocated building state power and stressed agriculture over commerce, the need to 
always be prepared for war, the importance of the having strict laws firmly behind the 
state’s agenda to regulate the people, and the absolute authority of the state’s leader.  
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Among the Hundred Schools, the legalists had enormous impact on their time.  However, 
the Qin almost immediately faced opposition as a consequence of its harshness and 
rebellion that eventually destroyed the dynasty.   
The Han dynasty succeeded the short Qin rule in 206 BC.  Even though there was 
disdain for the Qin, future rulers adopted many of its ideas.  The Han dynasty used the 
philosophy of legalism for its institutions but it incorporated Confucianism as the official 
creed of the empire.119  
Confucianism was just one of the “hundred schools” that emerged during the 
Warring States period.  Even though Legalism was the first official philosophy under a 
united China, it proved to be too harsh and was replaced under the Han dynasty with 
Confucianism.  The Han and later dynasties incorporated many of the Legalist 
philosophies in their courts.  Confucius’s doctrine evolved over time but his vision and 
ideals with the exception of a few short periods became and remained an influential 
philosophy in China for the next two millennia.120 
B. THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONFUCIANISM 
The philosophy of early Confucianism consisted of a specific ideal and values that 
Confucius believed would restore order during a tumultuous time.  Much of what is 
known about Confucius and Confucianism is from books written by Confucian disciples, 
containing sayings and dialogue written centuries after Confucius was alive.   
1. The Values of Confucianism 
Confucius’ main preoccupation was to determine how to live a moral life in a 
chaotic, disorderly time.  The Zhou dynasty had instilled order in society with religious 
rituals but that had fallen by the wayside.  At the same time, the Zhou dynasty 
experienced political, social, and economic challenges that eventually led to the Warring 
States period.  Confucius believed the way to restore order in society was to restore 
rituals for a moral effect.  The solution to social order was through personal virtue, not by 
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law (which was completely opposite to the Legalist philosophy).  Confucius believed 
everybody was capable of improvement “but only at the cost of considerable hard work 
and constant application.”121   The hard work was necessary for one to grow and could be 
done, if they lived by a defined set of Confucian values: ren (humaneness), shu 
(reciprocity), zhong (loyalty), li (ritual), zhi (wisdom), yong (courage), xin 
(trustworthiness), jing (reverence), and xiao (filial piety). 
Ren (humaneness) is much like the golden rule—one should not do to others what 
one would not want done to himself.  Crucial for man to be humane to another is the 
practice of the Confucian values, shu (reciprocity—an in-kind response to another’s 
actions) and zhong (loyalty—specifically to oneself and one’s superiors).   
Li (ritual) is the value that compels one to act appropriately to one’s 
circumstances and role.  One must observe the proper rituals, ceremonies, and protocols 
to promote social cohesion and individual morality.122  Ritual was a vital Confucian 
value because it provided the means for one to favor the interests of the society at large 
instead of the natural human tendency to favor oneself. 
Zhi (wisdom) not only refers to gaining overall knowledge of facts but also an in 
depth understanding of human nature.  According to Confucius, “the most random 
element in human existence was human nature itself,” so one could only have influence 
and predict the course of events through years of study.123     
Yong (courage), to see what is right and to do it, was a value Confucius knew 
needed to be tempered with other values in order to lead one to real moral improvement.  
Confucius said, “Men of principle are sure to be bold, but those who are bold may not 
always be men of principle.”124      
Xin (trustworthiness) is the Confucian value to keep one’s word.  In a greater 
sense, to one has the obligation to not say something that is not true.  A Confucian uses 
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words sparingly in an effort not to say anything untrue or that might become untrue.  
Confucius taught that “the superior man wishes to be slow in his speech, and earnest in 
his conduct.”125  
Jing (reverence) refers to an awe one must have associated with the emotions that 
describe the awareness of the enormity of responsibility one has to their ancestors and 
promoting the welfare of the society.126  Reverence to family and the common people is 
of tremendous importance in defining a true gentlemen.  
Xiao (filial piety) is the value that describes the fundamental relationship between 
parent and child.  Filial piety is to show one’s parents and ancestors a devotion and 
obedience to their seniority in the family.127  Specifically, children had an unconditional 
duty to obey and respect their parents based on the assumption that parents treat their 
children with consideration and love.   
As one pursues the Confucian values between parent and child, elder and younger 
siblings, husband and wife, ruler and subject, and between friends (the five Confucian 
relationships), they acquire yi (righteousness) and eventually de (personal virtue)—the 
key to social order.   
Confucius taught that one’s moral perfection came in degrees.  The sheng ren (the 
sage) was the epitome of moral development.  Next down the scale was the shan ren (the 
good man).  Then there was the cheng ren (the complete man).  The sage, the good man, 
and the complete man were extremely rare (Confucius denied the sheng ren to any living 
person, even himself).128  The junzi (gentlemen) was the most morally perfected person 
one was likely to meet.  While Confucius’ emphasis on restoring ritual was conservative, 
his belief that anyone was capable of improvement through learning, education, and 
personal cultivation was intrinsically liberal. 
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2. The Confucian Writings 
Much of what is known about Confucius comes from the Analects, a collection of 
sayings compiled by Confucian disciples centuries after his death.129   In Confucius’ later 
years, he supposedly edited the Five Classics: the Classic of History, the Classic of 
Poetry, the Classic of Changes, the Classic of Rites, and the Spring and Autumn 
Annals.130  These books are the basics for Confucian scholars and form the basis of all 
subsequent Confucian studies.    
3. Confucianism after Confucius 
After the death of Confucius, his thought doctrines were elaborated upon and 
developed in different ways.  One of Confucius’ best known students, Mencius (372–289 
BC) expanded Confucian teachings.  Like Confucius, Mencius lived in the chaotic times 
of the Warring States Period and his desire was to stabilize society and restore order 
through individual morality by applying Confucian ideas on virtue directly to governing.  
Mencius advocated the idea that the people had the right to rebel and overthrow the 
government, if the government was unjust and immoral.  Mencius elaborated on many 
ideas only briefly mentioned in the Analects.  According to Bradley K. Hawkins, 
“subsequent Confucian philosophy is as much the thought of Mencius as it is of 
Confucius.”131  Like Confucius, Mencius and his ideas were not readily accepted.  
Nonetheless, Confucius doctrine whether by Confucius himself or his followers deeply 
penetrated Chinese society and has endured over two millennia.      
C. THE IDEALS OF CONFUCIANISM COMPARED TO THE IDEALS OF 
THE PLA 
The principal ideal of Confucianism, morality of the individual achieved through 
the life-long struggle to live the Confucian values of ren (humaneness), shu (reciprocity), 
zhong (loyalty), li (ritual), zhi (wisdom), yong (courage), xin (trustworthiness), jing 
(reverence), and xiao (filial piety) seems fundamentally opposite the PLA’s principal 
                                                 
129 Murphey, East Asia, 37. 
130 Hawkins, Asian Religions, 210. 
131 Ibid., 218. 
 41
ideal of putting the people above oneself through the five core military values of being 
loyal to the party, deeply cherishing the people, serving the country, showing devotion to 
missions, and upholding honor.  As there are concrete differences in the PLAs ideals and 
values compared with Confucian ideals and values, there are also abstract similarities.   
1. Similarities and Differences 
One fundamental similarity with the Confucian ideal of morality of the individual 
and the PLA ideal of putting the people above the individual is that both are ideals the 
common person can try to achieve.  Confucius and his disciples advocated that the 
morality of the individual was to be a way life for everybody—from those in the court to 
the everyday man—morality was for everyone.  Technically, anybody was eligible to 
study and learn which allowed one to theoretically move up in their level of moral 
perfection despite their class or seat in society.  Similarly, the ideals the PLA advocates 
are also applicable to the individual regardless of their rank or position.  Every member 
of the PLA despite their rank can apply the ideals they are learning.  The highest officer 
to the newest conscript is expected to put the people of China above themselves.  
Ironically, there is also a fundamental challenge to the PLA and the CCP leaders in this 
ideal.  In early times, meritocracy (where one is chosen to serve in government based on 
merit instead of social class, wealth, or family) was implemented by the examination 
system.  Political reform was determined by who passes the test, not on political loyalty.  
In contemporary times, if the PLA soldier did all he could to put China above himself, 
what if that meant sacrificing himself in order to replace the CCP with a  “better” 
government, i.e., replace the Communist Party in the name of putting China first?  The 
PLA and CCP leaders are careful to qualify putting the people of China above themselves 
to also mean unequivocally devoting oneself to the Communist Party as a duty and 
obligation. 
Confucian values and the Chinese military core values similarly reflect on loyalty, 
trustworthiness, knowledge, and respect.  These values are common in the purpose of 
identifying how one should make individual choices to put them on the path of achieving 
the ideal.  There are even similarities in the Confucian value of filial piety with that in the 
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PLA.  The chain of command in the military can be compared to a family relationship.   
There is to be respect between officer and enlisted much like that of the father and son.  
In this way, the elements of the PLA modernization structure draw on the martial values 
of China’s traditional past.  Not only are enlisted Chinese ranks trained to be loyal and 
respectful to their superiors, it is also expected of the superior to take responsibility and 
provide necessary resources for the lower-ranking military members much like it was the 
responsibility of the father to provide for the wellbeing of a child.  Another example is 
the act of self-criticism.  PLA leaders criticize themselves in order to identify and correct 
behavior (good and bad) in an effort to improve.  This practice, very popular in the 
Maoist era, echoes the idea that demands be directed to oneself before they are directed at 
others.132   
There are similarities in Confucian and PLA ideals and values, but there are also 
fundamental differences.  The values taught by Confucius and his followers were directed 
to provide change in the individual.  When the individual became more morally perfect, 
society as a whole would improve.  The chaos, war, economic troubles of Warring States 
Period would improve.  The Confucian ideals and values were aimed at the individual in 
the hope that collective individual morality of each person would influence and have an 
effect on the society for the better.  As for the PLA, it seems it is the opposite.  The CMC 
and the PLA leadership have tried to implement an ideal with values that focus on the 
whole society (put the people of China first), much like the typical Marxist/Leninist 
socialist ideals that when achieved will mean an effect to the individual.   
Even though contemporary Chinese leadership postulates an ideal that focuses on 
the society as a whole with an effect on the individual, there have been individualistic 
elements of Confucianism in Chinese culture and society for centuries.  Confucianism 
has been a part of Chinese history for more than 2000 years.  Even during the Cultural 
Revolution beginning in 1966 and carried out until the death of Mao in 1976, the Chinese 
held on to elements of Confucianism as Mao and other CCP officials berated traditional 
Chinese traditions in an effort to cleanse the Party and government of anti-socialist 
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movements.  Because elements of Confucian thought and morals had penetrated the 
fabric of Chinese society so many centuries ago, “to be Chinese is, in some sense at least, 
to be Confucian.”133 
2. Why the PLA Has Its Core Military Values 
If the core military values and ideals Hu Jintao mandated are to be used in the 
PLA have fundamental differences than the ancient Confucian values, why does the PLA 
have its current core military values and ideals?  The fact is the current military values 
the PLA teaches are not much different from those of other militaries.  A better question 
might be, why do militaries have core values? 
The military values the PLA teaches are much like the values identified by other 
contemporary militaries.  The core values of the British Army are, “selfless commitment, 
courage, discipline, integrity, loyalty, and respect for others.”134 The British Army’s 
Military Covenant describes an overall ideal of having soldiers put their Nation, The 
Army, and others before themselves.  The U.S. Navy refers to its core values as “bedrock 
principles” which are “honor, courage, and commitment.”135  The U.S. Navy uses each of 
these values to describe a sailor’s relationship with others and duty to the nation.  The 
PLA’s core values are in principle very much like those core values and ideals of other 
nations.’    
It is common and expected for a modern military to have a set of core values that 
encompass a military ethic.  The U.S. Army’s capstone doctrinal field manual, Field 
Manual (FM) 1 states, “Each profession establishes a unique subculture that distinguishes 
practitioners from the society they serve while supporting and enhancing that society.  
Professions create their own standards of performance and codes of ethics to maintain 
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their effectiveness.”136  A link is made between effectiveness and a military having an 
ethic defined by a set of core values during times of transition. 
Militaries are inherently always in some sort of constant state of transition.  On 
the battlefield, the injury or death of a soldier will require reinforcements.  Unit stability 
and cohesiveness is easier to maintain if the new reinforcements are acquainted with and 
adhere to the same ethic and set of values as those they replace.  The effectiveness of a 
battle unit in training or on the battlefield is largely determined by unity.  Another 
inherent constant state of transition is the result of modernization.  Especially in 
contemporary militaries, the pace of technological improvement, transition to new 
weapon systems, different types and sizes of units, and ever-changing different military 
social conditions, it is vital that each military person as well as military leadership bond 
around values for maximum effectiveness  and growth through that transition.  This is 
especially true for militaries whose aim it is to modernize quickly. 
The CCP is not reviving values and ideals associated with Confucianism in its 
drive to modernize China’s military.  Instead, the CCP is incorporating values and ideals 
similar, if not exactly the same as other modernizing militaries.  Values embody what an 
organization stands for.  The PLA’s core values are the primary basis for its soldiers’ 
behavior.  The lack of a primary basis leads to a disconnection between the 
organizational and individual values.  The PLA is in such constant transition as it races to 
modernize that not having core values like those of other modernizing militaries could 
lead to dysfunction.  Dysfunction in China’s military could be very dangerous to the 
ruling regime.  The CCP counts on the PLA to be professional, loyal, and ready when 
called upon.  If there is dysfunction, there is diminished control.  Loss of control could be 
fatal to the CCP.   
The Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 is an example.  As millions of students 
demonstrated in 132 cities, including Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, CCP leadership could 
not decide how to deal with the demonstrations.  Eventually, the Politburo Standing 
Committee declared martial law and tasked the PLA to restore order.  Confrontation 
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immediately arose between PLA troops and citizens as the PLA entered Beijing.  There 
was hesitation on the PLA’s behalf as to how to control the situation.  Only one senior 
PLA commander was charged with refusing to obey Deng Xiaoping’s orders for the PLA 
to quell the demonstrations, but Deng called in other PLA units from other areas of China 
to be sure the military units in Beijing stood behind the action.137  On 4 June 1989, PLA 
tanks and soldiers entered Tiananmen Square and hundreds, and possibly thousands of 
demonstrators were killed.  The Tiananmen Square incident left the CCP on the fringe of 
command as its regular control measures; control of the press, loyalty of the PLA, and 
control of the people were put in serious jeopardy.   
The CCP cannot afford to lose the PLA’s allegiance.  “The chief political 
commissar in the PLA made the remarkable public statement that Hu Jintao is ‘greatly 
concerned’ about the stability in the Army.”138  Since 1989, not only has the CCP 
introduced and required the PLA to teach, train, and modernize with core military values.  
Since 2004, in becoming CMC chairman, Hu has continually called on the PLA for 
absolute loyalty.  Funding has increased to the PLA to compensate for the loss of funding 
as a result of the order given to the PLA to divest itself of commercial businesses (used to 
supplement their government funding).  The PLA received bigger budgets to compensate 
and curb the corruption that blossomed from the commercial businesses.  In addition, the 
role of the PLA to police the society is slightly different.  The CCP has put the People’s 
Armed Police (PAP), a paramilitary organization that monitors and polices domestic 
security issues as the first line of defense against political unrest.  According to Susan 
Shirk, by making the PAP the first line of defense against domestic unrest, the CCP 
reduces the risk the PLA might refuse to take action against Chinese civilians, as well as 
take military action against civilian leaders.139 
The PLA, like other modernizing militaries, has core values to relieve the tension 
of transition inherent to militaries and amplified by change induced by modernization and 
to provide a solid foundation necessary to underline the training and military education 
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and ensure loyalty and control.  It is vital and absolutely necessary for the CCP to take all 
steps necessary to ensure the control and loyalty of the PLA.   Ideals and core values can 
provide a military a foundation for all training and education and reduce the chance of 
dysfunction when orders are given and expected to be obeyed.  Especially in the fog of 
war when rational thinking and human behavior is tested and challenged, a military 
without a basis of ideals and core values is susceptible to disconnection between 
leadership and the individual which leads to dysfunction.  Dysfunction of the PLA not 
only undermines the effectiveness of the Chinese military but the ultimate survivability of 
the CCP. 
D.  CONCLUSION 
Confucianism emerged in a tumultuous time in Chinese history.  Confucius and 
his disciples presented an ideal and values aimed at perfecting ones individual morality 
which in turn would benefit the society.  The main ideal of Confucianism, individual 
morality, and the main ideal of the PLA, putting the people above oneself, are not the 
same.  The Confucian ideal focuses on the individual, which will affect the society, and 
the PLA ideal focuses on the whole with the effect on the individual.  The core values the 
PLA has incorporated are somewhat similar to Confucian values but look much more like 
the core values other modernizing militaries use as a foundation for training and 
education in a volatile transitional environment.  The PLA has core values to facilitate 
loyalty and control and reduce the chance of dysfunction.  Dysfunction in the PLA not 





IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The CCP has adjusted its ideology to maintain national spirit and maintain power.  
Whereas some have argued the PLA has incorporated ideals and values associated with 
Confucianism in its drive to modernize, it seems more likely the ideals and values 
incorporated are commonly used by other modernizing militaries.  The ideals and values 
the PLA has incorporated through its modernization transition provide military unity and 
ultimately regime stability.  Today’s PLA is under strain as it modernizes and as China 
transforms into a modern society.  The PLA needs core values to maintain and increase 
stability and reinforce unity during the potentially volatile modernization transition.     
A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PLA AND ITS CORE VALUES 
The choice of Chinese leaders to have the PLA stand behind the ideal of putting 
the people above oneself instead of focusing on the Confucian ideal of focusing on CCP 
the individual for the eventual change in society makes sense given the challenges the 
and the PLA face today.  As new challenges emerge for the CCP and the PLA due to 
military modernization and globalization, the focus of the PLA on the whole instead of 
the individual provides control, stability, and unity necessary for a modernizing military 
in transition.   
1. A Time of Transition Presents Obstacles 
The PLA is undergoing a fundamental transition as it transforms to a modernized 
military.  With transition come obstacles introduced by change inherent to all large 
organizations.  The PLA in its quest to modernize and become a high-tech joint force 
faces monumental challenges.  The obstacles the PLA faces can introduce disorder and 
put strain on the PLA and CCP leadership.  In addition, not only is the PLA challenged 
from modernization and professionalization in its own right, the Chinese military is also 
strained from changes brought about as China as a whole is also undergoing major 
transition.  As China transitions from a traditional agrarian society to a modern society, a 
socialist economy to a market economy, and from a Leninist political system to a society 
with increasingly more democratic tendencies, there is increased strain on the Chinese 
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leadership.140  The increased strain provides explanation why the CCP and the PLA 
promote ideals and core values with a focus on the people and society and not the 
individual as with the traditional Confucian ideal of individual morality.  If the CCP and 
PLA have rallied behind an ideal and set of core values similar to other Western nations, 
this implies that it can be expected the Chinese will possibly rally behind other military 
doctrine common in Western militaries as future challenges and obstacles present 
themselves.  The CCP over its 80-plus year struggle in the modern world has vast 
experience in trying to keep up with conditions posed as a result of the changing of the 
times.  Hu Jintao, in a speech commemorating Mao Zedong’s 110th birth anniversary 
stated,  
We must persist in emancipating the mind, seeking truth from facts, and 
advancing with the times; continue to integrate the basic tenets of 
Marxism with China’s concrete reality under the conditions of the new 
era; and constantly promote the Sinicization of Marxism.  We must foster 
a broad worldview; take an overall view of the general trends of 
development in the world’s economic, political, cultural, scientific and 
technological, and military affairs; persist in opening up to the outside 
world; actively draw on the useful achievements and experiences of the 
people in other countries in achieving economic development and social 
progress….141  
Even though the PLA may make use of military doctrine and practices from 
Western countries to address its obstacles, it takes longer for the Chinese military to 
adapt to doctrinal innovation even though Chinese rhetoric or aspirations might otherwise 
indicate.  The U.S. military normally takes seven or eight years for significant doctrinal 
change to penetrate to the unit level and for the Chinese it is longer.142  Knowing the 
Chinese military adapts to present day challenges by borrowing and implementing 
doctrine from other Western militaries is useful for military analysts and foreign policy 
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makers in understanding what the PLA is doing today to overcome its modernization 
challenges, as well as what to expect in future Chinese military doctrine. 
Furthermore, seeing how the PLA incorporates values and ideals similar to other 
modernizing militaries sheds light on China’s strategic culture debate.  The core of the 
strategic culture debate is that strategy is determined by subjective, interpreted 
experiences consistently transmitted to unrelated people over time.143  Some have argued 
that Beijing’s approach to the use of force, its views on strategy, and its preferences 
regarding what kind of military it requires and the kind of soldiers it should train reflect 
characteristically “Chinese” cultural preferences and choices.  The PLA having 
incorporated values and ideals similar to other modernizing militaries and not necessarily 
solely characteristic of Chinese culture signifies more of an argument against China 
having its own strategic culture.  China’s regime and military leadership may be expected 
to incorporate other tenants of modernizing militaries like training curriculums, education 
requirements, retirement age caps, active duty and reserve manning structures, and rank 
advancement quotas utilized by other modernizing militaries.  Nonetheless, as China’ 
military modernizes there will continue to be constant reminder to military members by 
CCP and PLA leadership that changes will have Chinese characteristics because of the 
importance of unification and regime stability.    Stephen Rosen wrote,  
The less a military organization reflects the structure to the society, either 
because it is recruited from subgroups who are not representative of the 
society as a whole or because the officers and soldiers are socialized by 
training and discipline to operate within structures that the society as a 
whole does not accept, the more the military will be perceive as a alien 
element in society, as a group that is not representative of society.  This 
can lead to distrust of the military by the society or its leaders, which can 
reduce the military power available to the state.144 
It is imperative for regime stability that as the military modernizes the PLA and 
must not appear to be isolated from Chinese society diminishing its strength on the 
domestic and international levels of power.         
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2.  The PLA Needs Core Values 
There are other challenges the PLA faces today. The ideals and core values 
implemented by the PLA maintain and increase stability and reinforce unity during the 
potentially volatile modernization transition. 
Social changes in the military pose legitimate concern for PLA leadership.  As the 
generations of old, well versed in Mao thought, and who have experienced first-hand the 
struggles from the failed Great Leap Forward are being replaced by a younger generation 
who have not experienced such sacrifice for the state, the ideal of putting the people first 
becomes increasingly harder to instill in the minds of younger military members.  The 
core values of today’s PLA, much like those of other modernizing militaries, provide a 
foundation for all service members to relate with thereby helping to ensure military 
members both old and young have a foundational point of reference.       
Adding to the strain for the PLA and the CCP is the increasing influences of 
globalization.  China continues to experience monumental change as a result of 
globalization.  The PLA is expected by the CCP to “shoulder the historical mission of 
ensuring all-dimensional security for economic construction.”145  Not only does the PLA 
need to acquire technology to win a high-tech local war, it also needs to further develop 
and maintain a sound ideological foundation resilient to the threats of globalization.  
International competitiveness, the demand for regional stability in order to facilitate 
strong sustained economic growth, and the increased responsibility China has in 
international affairs as the state steadily climbs up the “Great Power” ladder means the 
Chinese military will be faced with more complex domestic and international challenges. 
At the same time, the PLA is expected to shoulder the domestic and international 
security burden as a result of an economically flowering China, the CCP relies on the 
PLA’s core values and ideals to ensure the militaries loyalty.  In 1938, Mao Zedong 
wrote, “Every Communist must grasp the truth, ‘Political power grows out of the barrel 
of a gun.’ Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be 
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allowed to command the Party.”146   Absolute loyalty and Party support, an underlining 
theme of the PLA’s ideal to put the people above oneself, is one more reminder for the 
millions of Chinese military members who are the backbone of the CCP regime 
legitimacy.  The PLA’s core values clarify allegiances, define acceptable ethical 
behavior, clarify competing ideological thoughts, and establish a benchmark for military 
members’ actions with each other and with society. 
Take the crisis of corruption in the PLA for example.  Corruption and the 
problems that arise from corruption are extremely serious and jeopardize the stability of 
the PLA structure.  To highlight the centrality of corruption in the PLA, in 2006 an 
authoritative commentary from the Liberation Army Daily stated, “At present, our army 
building is moving from a period of mechanization or semi-mechanization toward a 
period of informatization and is facing two historic projects of winning wars and 
eradicating corruption.”147  Eradicating corruption in the PLA is equated in priority to 
winning wars.  To prevent the spread of corruption, the PLA publically stepped up its 
efforts by launching an education campaign on Hu’s “socialist concept of honor and 
disgrace.”148  The PLA now also uses the foundation of its core values to stem the tide of 
corruption in the military.  The PLA core values of upholding honor, cherishing the 
people, and being loyal to the party directly conflict with a soldier taking bribes or other 
similar malfeasance.  Unit level education, awareness campaigns, and constantly 
promoting the core values will curb corruption.  General Zhang Wannian, vice chairman 
of the Central Military Commission in 1998 argued that fighting corruption was crucial 
for stability and unity in the Chinese military and for the country.  Zhang stated, “only a 
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clean Army can help the country to reach its target of military modernization.”149  One 
implication here is that the PLA is using its core values to address serious fundamental 
problems in the Chinese military.  
B. CONCLUSION 
China has had to adjust as it emerges as a major world power.  Globalization, a 
changing society, and a rapidly modernizing military has caused the CCP to adjust its 
ideology to maintain national spirit and maintain power.  The CCP relies on the PLA for 
ultimate domestic stability and security as China embarks further down the road of 
economic construction.  The challenges the PLA face, as it strives to acquire technology 
to fight and win a high-tech local war, combat major issues like corruption, and step up to 
the greater demands for regional stability have caused the PLA to adjust its ideology and 
values to ensure unity and loyalty. 
The CCP is not reviving values and ideals associated with Confucianism in its 
drive to modernize China’s military.  Instead, the CCP is incorporating values and ideals 
similar to other modernizing militaries.  The ideals and values the PLA has incorporated 
have some similarities to ancient Chinese ideals but overall are comparatively different.  
Confucius and his followers taught ideals and values directed to provide change for the 
individual.  When the individual became more morally perfect, society as a whole would 
improve having the affect of easing the chaos, war, and economic troubles of the Warring 
States Period.  The Confucian ideals and values were aimed at the individual with the 
hope that collective individual morality of each person would influence and have an 
effect on the society for the better.  As for the PLA, it is the opposite.  The CMC and the 
PLA leadership have tried to implement an ideal with values that focus on the whole 
society (put the people of China first), much like the typical Marxist/Leninist socialist 
ideals that when achieved will mean an effect to the individual.  The Confucian values: 
ren (humaneness), shu (reciprocity), zhong (loyalty), li (ritual), zhi (wisdom), yong 
(courage), xin (trustworthiness), jing (reverence), and xiao (filial piety) have some 
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abstract similarities but are comparatively different to the PLA’s core values of being 
loyal to the party, deeply cherishing the people, serving the country, showing devotion to 
missions, and upholding honor.  The values and ideals the PLA uses to modernize are 
more comparable to other modernizing militaries. 
The incorporation of new ideals and values into the PLA signifies more of an 
argument against China having its own strategic culture.  The PLA can be expected to 
incorporate other tenants of modernizing militaries like training curriculums, education 
requirements, retirement age caps, active duty and reserve manning structures, and rank 
advancement quotas.  Nonetheless, as China’ military becomes more modern, the CCP 
and PLA leadership will continue to provide constant reminder to military members that 
changes will have “Chinese characteristics” because of the importance of unification and 
regime stability.  The PLA must not appear to be isolated from Chinese society. 
Today’s PLA is under strain as it modernizes and as China transforms into a 
modern society.  The PLA needs core values to maintain and increase stability and 
reinforce unity during the potentially volatile modernization transition.  The core values 
of today’s PLA, much like those of other modernizing militaries, provide a foundation for 
all service members to relate with thereby helping to ensure military members both old 
and young have a foundational point of reference in order to cope with the many 
challenges of transition and reduce the chance of dysfunction.  The PLA’s core values 
clarify allegiances, define acceptable ethical behavior, elucidate competing ideological 
thoughts, establish a benchmark for military members’ actions with each other and with 
society, and facilitate loyalty to the CCP. 
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